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THE PURPOSES OF ADVOCACY AND THE 
LIMITS OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
John T. Noonan, Jr.* 
T HE privilege of confidentiality between lawyer and client is a significant barrier to the search for truth and the attainment of 
justice. Since bankers, accountants, psychiatrists, and confessors are 
not entitled at common law to confidentiality in their relationships 
with those with whom they deal, one may well inquire why lawyers 
possess such an extraordinary privilege. In the early English case 
which established the lawyer-client privilege, counsel offered several 
justifications: (I) A "gentleman of character" does not disclose his 
client's secrets. (2) An attorney identifies himself with his client, 
and it would be "contrary to the rules of natural justice and equity" 
for an individual to betray himself. (3) Attorneys are necessary for 
the conduct of business, and business would be destroyed if attor-
neys were to disclose their communications with their clients.1 
None of the above justifications seems very persuasive today. 
Gentlemen of character have no legally recognized immunity from 
testifying about their friends' secrets. The identification of lawyer 
and client is, at best, only a metaphor, indicating an underlying 
policy justification for the privilege. Finally, attorneys are no more 
essential to the conduct of general business than are accountants, 
bankers, and secretaries, who do not enjoy the privilege. The sus-
picion arises that' the legal profession Iias carved out for itself a 
privilege which it is reluctant to grant to other equally necessary 
and honorable men merely because the privilege is good for the 
legal business. 
However, the secrecy of information communicated by a client 
to a lawyer may have a more rational justification than those dis-
cussed above when the information is divulged in preparation for 
a trial. The purpose of emplo~ng a trial lawyer is to assert one's 
rights in a lawsuit; this purpo;e might be defeated if a relevant 
secret were available to one side merely by calling the opposing 
counsel to testify. Therefore, if the essential function of lawyers is 
to conduct trials, they must be able to receive relevant information 
and keep it confidential. 
To say that a lawyer's function is to conduct a trial, however, 
does not suffice, for one must inquire into the purposes of a trial 
• Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.-Ed. 
I am indebted to the suggestions of my colleague, Professor G. Robert Blakey. 
1. Annesley v, Anglesey, 17 How. St. Tr. 1140, 1223-26, 1241 (Ex. 1743). 
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and of trial advocacy. If one agrees with Charles Curtis that a trial 
• is an irrational process-a substitute for trial by battle which gives 
the litigant the satisfaction of having "his day in court"2-one may 
conclude that the function of the advocate is to be a friendly cham-
pion who, by his wholehearted devotion to the cause, is able to sat-
isfy his client's desire for a day in court. It is hard to deny that 
many trials of the past, and some of the present, suggest the appro• 
priateness of such an analysis. If this theory of the purposes of a trial 
and of advocacy is accepted, there is no reason why the solutions 
proposed by Professor Monroe Freedman to his three hypothetical 
cases should be rejected. Since many trial lawyers believe, perhaps 
subconsciously, that the Curtis view is an accurate reflection of what 
actually happens in a trial, it is easy to understand why Professor 
Freedman's solutions seem plausible, if not mandatory; he has 
merely expressed as a norm what is, in fact, current practice for 
some practitioners. Indeed, the merit of Professor Freedman's ex-
position is that he candidly exposes the working principles of many 
lawyers at the same time that he makes those principles vital by 
showing how they would govern particular cases. This scholarly ex-
plication of what is often taken for granted serves a very useful 
function. 
Professor Freedman's analysis, however, presupposes that the 
Curtis theory, or something approximating it, is a correct descrip• 
tion of the trial process. Yet, Curtis' description of the system ob-
scures three important points. First, although a trial may be a battle, 
not only is physical violence excluded, but some purely peaceful 
tactics such as the subornation of perjury and the introduction of 
faked documents are discouraged; the system gives each litigant his 
day in court, but it also excludes obviously false information. 
Second, the satisfaction the client receives depends not on his sense 
of the friendly atmosphere of the court, but rather on his feeling 
that justice is being done, insofar as he is being heard, for the client 
will usually believe that once he is heard, truth will prevail. Third, 
the truth-discovering techniques of Anglo-American law have de-
veloped from such crude devices as trial by battle to more refined 
and more ample procedures such as detailed interrogatories and dis-
covery procedures under the Federal Rules; this evolution must be 
taken into consideration in any analysis of purposes of the system. 
A second, perhaps more appropriate view of a trial and of the 
adversary system is the view endorsed in 1958 by the Joint Confer-
2, Ctmns, !T's Yotm LAW 17-21 (1954). 
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ence on Professional Responsibility of the Association of American 
Law Schools and the American Bar Association. It is a modem view 
in that it looks less at the way in which trials have been conducted 
in the past than at the way in which they may be conducted in the 
future. A trial is seen as a process "within which man's capacity for 
impartial judgment can attain its fullest realization,"3 and the func-
. tion of the advocate is to assist the trier of fact in making this 
impartial judgment. In a non-adversary system, the tribunal would 
do its own investigating, have its mm theory of the case, and pos-
sibly decide the issues too quickly. On the other hand, the adversary 
system permits the tribunal to remain uncommitted while a case 
is explored from opposing viewpoints, thus requiring the liability 
or guilt to be demonstrated publicly to a neutral tribunal. In this 
view of the system, "the advocate plays his role well when zeal for 
his client's cause promotes a wise and informed decision of the case."4 
Evidently, if the Joint Conference's approach is taken, distinc-
tions must be made in answering Professor Freedman's three hypo-
theticals. As to the first problem,5 it could be argued that the sole 
function of an advocate is to produce a wise and informed ultimate 
judgment. In the process of assisting the trier in attaining this final 
result, counsel therefore may properly obscure or impugn testimony 
which, while true, would not be relevant to the determination of 
guilt but rather would merely create an erroneous impression.6 For 
example, a defense lawyer could attempt to impair the credibility of 
a witness who testified truthfully before a jury of Negroes that'the 
defendant was a member of the Ku Klux Klan. By destroying the 
true but irrelevant testimony, it is argued, the advocate would, 'in 
fact, contribute to a wise ultimate result. This reasoning, however, 
does not seem persuasive. Rather, it resembles the paternalism which 
is so often invoked as an excuse for not trusting others with the 
truth. Instead of attempting to destroy the testimony it would be 
better to refrain from impeaching the truthful witness and to trust 
the trier of fact to draw the right conclusions. The law itself pro-
vides mechanisms for excluding irrelevant and prejudicial evidence; 
where evidence is not clearly irrelevant, a Ia-wyer should not attempt 
to exclude it at the cost of attacking a truthful witness. Repeated 
3. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1160-61 
(1958). 
4. Ibid. 
5. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The 
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469 (1966). 
6. Professor Freedman uses a slightly different rationale to reach the same con• 
clusion. See id. at 1474-75. 
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acts of confidence in the rationality of the trial system are necessary 
if the decision-making process is to approach rationality. 
The second hypothetical7 is easier than the first to solve in terms 
of the Joint Conference's theory. To permit a client who will com-
mit perjury to take the stand does not contribute to a wise and 
informed decision. It is difficult to differentiate among forging 
documents, suborning another witness, and calling one's own client 
with the knowledge that he will lie. An impartial, informed, and 
wise decision presupposes that the person deciding a case has been 
given the truth. To furnish him with a lie is to mock impartiality, 
to mislead rather than to inform, and to stultify the decisional 
process rather than to make it an exploration leading to mature 
judgment. 
The third hypothetical8 would seem to be answerable, in part, 
the same way under both Professor Freedman's analysis and that 
of the Joint Conference. A lawyer should not be paternalistic toward 
his client, and cannot assume that his client will perjure himself. 
Furthermore, a lawyer has an obligation to furnish his client with 
all the legal information relevant to his case; in fulfilling this duty 
to inform his client, a lawyer would normally not violate ethical 
standards. Motives may properly be given their weight after the legal 
consequences of an act are known by the client, for a human being 
rarely acts with a completely undivided heart. Although the courts 
have made a generous allowance for this multiplicity of human mo-
tivations, there is a point, however, at which it becomes brute ratio-
nalization to claim that the legal advice tendered to a client is meant 
to contribute to wise and informed decision-making. For example, a 
lawyer may, in substance, be suggesting perjury rather than giving 
legal advice when the lawyer knows that the facts are completely con-
trary to the defense which he outlines to his client. In Anatomy of a 
Murder, Paul Biegler won his case, but lost his fee.0 Possibly this re-
sult reflects the author's own conception of a just reward for Biegler's 
manipulative use of the system. Professor Freedman seems to feel 
that to refuse to tell a client of a defense which is not supported by 
the facts would penalize truth-telling clients; the answer is that truth 
sometimes has unfortunate consequences. 
Thus, if one considers that the function of the advocate is to 
'assist in the formulation of wise· and informed decisions, there is a 
limit to the confidentiality of communication between client and trial 
7 •. Id. at 1469. 
8. Ibid. 
9. TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER (1958). 
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counsel. The partisanship involved in keeping a conmunication con-
fidential must be restricted when it leads to conduct .which destroys 
the truth or presents perjury to the fact-finder. Indeed, in some in-
stances, courts may even compel a lawyer to testify about confidential 
information revealed to him by a client. The communication of an 
intention to commit a crime is not privileged;10 neither does the 
privilege exist if a lawyer has a pre-existing duty which precludes 
him from acting for a client.11 Some courts have held that only"rele-
vant information is privileged12 and that information may not re-
main confidential after the client's death.13 All of these qualifica-
tions present difficult questions which a naYve client, believing his 
communications were truly free from disclosure by his ~awyer, 
would not anticipate.14 Thus, it appears that neither confidentiality 
nor the adversary system is an absolute; each is justified pragmati-
cally by its ability to serve certain social need$. Professor Freedman 
repeatedly treats a privileged communication as an absolute which 
takes precedence over all other values. He justifies this by asserting 
that complete lawyer-client confidentiality is necessary to the adver-
sary. system. Yet such confidentiality is necessary to the adversary 
system only if the system exists as Professor Freedman views it. 
Asserted as a standard by which to measure the lawyer's conduct 
in all situations, absolute confidentiality is inimical to a system 
which has as its end rational decision-making. 
It might, however, be objected that I have not sufficiently con-
sidered the requirements of a criminal trial. In criminal trials, the 
privilege against self-incrimination has a far more significant impact 
on the procedure than it does in civil trials. Dominant 'among the 
multiple purposes of this constitutional privilege are the creation of 
some balance between the government and the individual and the 
10. E.g., United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37, 3940 (2d Cir. 1939). 
11. E.g., Prichard v. United States, 181 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1950). 
12. E.g., Snow v. Gould, 74 Me. 540, 543 (1883). 
13. In re Graf's Estate, 119 N.W.2d 478 (N.D. 1963). 
14. In the ancient civil case first recognizing the privilege, the issue was whether 
an earl's solicitor could disclose his client's intent to arrange the judicial hanging of 
a rival for his estate. The court, while recognizing the privilege, ordered disclosure 
of the information. One ground of the decision was that the communication was not 
relevant to the earl's legal business, although in fact it bore very heavily on the earl's 
willingness to settle certain lawsuits in which the solicitor was involved. Annesley v. 
Anglesey, 17 How. St. Tr. 1140, 1223-26, 1241 (Ex. 1743). Randolph Paul says that "in 
some instances taxpayers are unaware of the safety inherent in the confidential rela-
tionship which exists between tax clients and their attorneys." Paul, Responsibilities 
of the Tax Adviser, 63 HARV. L. REv. 377, 383 (1950). He apparently does not point 
out to them that this privilege is limited; if the client reveals an intent to continue 
a plan of tax evasion, there is no judicially recognizable confidentiality attending 
the communication. 
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assurance of respect for the person of the defendant.1ti It may be as-
serted that the objective of displaying respect for the humanity of a 
defendant cuts across and limits the truth-discovering purpose of a 
trial, and that, therefore, the privilege of confidentiality in a crim-
inal trial should be absolute. This approach can be persuasive, espe-
cially if the tendency to expand the meaning and scope of the con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination is interpreted as a 
series of advances in the protection of the person.10 Nevertheless, 
truth-discovering may still be a dominant purpose of a criminal trial. 
The criminal process operates in such a way that a large number 
of convictions are obtained by admissions; in this decade, roughly 
five sixths of those convicted in the federal courts have pleaded nolo 
contendere or guilty.17 Recent decisions have resulted in a marked 
lessening of the adversary role of the prosecutor, who is now com-
pelled to respond to the broad discovery rights of the defendant,18 
is prohibited from suppressing evidence helpful to the defendant,10 
and is required to make the names of the material witnesses avail-
able to the defendant.20 While this trend could be considered an-
other series of advances in the protection of the individual, it could 
also be interpreted as an effort to eliminate those characteristics of 
a trial which have made trials appear to be somewhat of a game.21 
The adversary system is not eliminated by such changes, but its irra-
tional aspects are diminished, and if the trend is truly one of elimi-
nating the irrational, it may be expected that the irrational elements 
favoring the defendant will also be reduced. In the new Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the courts are given the power to 
condition discovery by a defendant on the defendant's giving the 
government a limited right to discovery.22 It may be expected that 
if the government prosecutor cannot present a doubtful witness 
without calling the defendant's attention to his lack of credibility,23 
15. See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Note, 78 HARV. L. REV. 
426 (1964). 
16. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
17. DIRECTOR OF THE .ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANN. 
REP. 132 (1963). 
18. Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487 (1963); Bowman Dairy v. United States, 
341 U.S. 214 (1951). 
19. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Note, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 92, 103 
(1965). 
20. United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964). 
21. Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.2d 707, 711 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 948 
(1959). 
22. FED. R: CRIM. P. 16b, 16c, as amended Feb. 28, 1966, to take effect July 1, 1966. 
23. Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.2d 707, 711 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 948 
Q%~ . 
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the defendant's lawyer may be asked to observe the same standard 
as to his witnesses. Should there be any difference if the witness is 
the defendant himself? Is it really an enhancement of the rights of 
the person or a protection of the defendant's dignity to permit him 
to commit perjury with his lawyer's acquiescence? These questions 
are raised because it is difficult to believe that the defense of human 
rights depends upon a deliberate avoidance of the rational. 
Extensive subordination of the lawyer's interests to those of his 
client also has an effect on the lawyer himself. Professor Freedman is 
concerned about the rights of the client; but what of the rights of the 
lawyer? Professor Freedman's chief authorities are the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics of the American Bar Association, Opinion 287 inter-
preting Canons 29 and 37,24 and the case of Johns v. Smyth.25 While 
the Canons, which were adopted at the beginning of this century, do 
not offer as clear or as rational a view of the advocate's function as is 
found in the report of the 1958 Joint Conference, they are significant 
in so far as they are the work of a professional group which refu~ed 
to let professional requirements be the ultimate norm. The Canons 
do not say that the man is to be subordinated to the advocate or that 
a lawyer, qua lawyer, is to be less than human. On this cardinal 
point, the Canons are squarely in disagreement with the extra-
ordinary dictum in Johns v. Smyth.26 Under the heading, "How far 
may a lawyer go in supporting a client's cause," the Canons recog-
nize the need for "warm zeal" in the maintenance of a client's rights, 
but they conclude flatly that the lawyer "must obey his own con-
science and not that of his client."27 
It is inconceivable that Professor Freedman would endorse a 
system in which a lawyer is merely the willing tool, mouthpiece, or 
technician for his client. Only a moral idealist would so uncompro-
misingly proclaim his position as Professor Freedman has done. 
Only a moral absolutist would say that a criminal's plea of not guilty 
is a lie.28 Professor Freedman is so strongly in favor of candor and 
24. Opinion 287, Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American 
Bar Association (1953). 
25. 176 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Va. 1959). 
26. Id. at 953: "[T]he defendant was entitled to the faithful and devoted services 
of his attorney uninhibited by the dictating conscience." The lawyer, when he could 
not conscientiously proceed with the defense, should have offered his client the option 
of seeking other counsel. In failing to do so, he deprived his client of the basic right 
to choose a lawyer who was willing to act for him. But see Orkin, Defense of One 
Known To Be Guilty, 1 CRIM. L.Q. 170, 174 (1958). 
27. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 15 (1908). 
28. Professor Freedman posits a "moralist" who will tell lawyers that they lie in 
1492 Michigan Law Review 
idealism that he in effect exposes the working principles of some 
lawyers by spelling out explicitly their assumptions and the conse-
quences of those assumptions. Like many idealists, however, he is 
so candid that he may be mistaken for a cynic by the unenlightened. 
His position is not cynical, but it does seem to ignore the dangers 
inherent in defining the lawyer's role without broader consideration 
of the demands of human personality and of society. I would hope 
that reflection on the nature of the moral automatons which lawyers 
would logically become under Professor Freedman's view might 
cause him to reconsider his premises. 
A lawyer should not impose his conscience on his client; neither 
can he accept his client's decision and remain entirely free from all 
moral responsibility, subject only to the restraints of the criminal 
law. The framework of the adversary system provides only the first 
set of guidelines for a lawyer's conduct. He is also a human being 
and cannot submerge his humanity by playing a technician's role. 
Although the obligation to be candid is not so absolute that it can-
not be affected by context, both the seeking and stating of truth are 
so necessary to the human personality and so demanded by broad 
social values that the systematic presentation of falsehood is both 
personally demeaning and socially frustrating. Moreover, the adver-
sary system itself does not demand active suppression of truth. As 
a free person, cooperating with another free person-his client-to 
prove the client's innocence in a way which will also lead to the 
revelation of truth, the lawyer must act with regard for the require-
ments of the adversary system and with concern for his own stan-
dards as a human person, as well as with regard for the requirements 
of the society which the system serves. 
entering such a plea. However, the obligation to tell the truth is seen today as 
dependent on the duty to respond. Moreover, words have no absolute significance, 
The plea "not guilty," as used in the context of a court proceeding, is understood 
by everyone to mean, "I cannot be proved guilty of the charge by the ordinary process 
of law." 
